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If agents have rich higher order beliefs (multidimensional private sig-
nals), then (one dimensional) public signals will not usually generate ap-
proximate common knowledge. But in a noisy rational expectations equilib-
rium, as noise disappears, one dimensional prices reveal a su¢ cient statistic
for two dimensional uncertainty.
1. Introduction
Coordination games famously give rise to multiple equilibria. But Carlsson and
van Damme (1993) noted that relaxing the common knowledge of payo⁄s assump-
tion, by assuming that players observe the true payo⁄s with a small amount of
noise, would remove the multiplicity of equilibria. Allowing private information
to be considerably more accurate that public information contained in the prior
about payo⁄s removed common knowledge or approximate common knowledge of
payo⁄s. More generally, uniqueness will arise if there is not "too much public
information".
Consider the following simple illustration of this principle. A continuum popu-
lation must invest or not invest. The return to investing is 0. The cost of investing
is c 2 (0;1). The return to investing is 1 if the proportion investing is at least ￿, 0
otherwise. If ￿ were common knowledge, there would be multiple Nash equilibria
(all invest, all not invest) as long as ￿ were between zero and one. But suppose
instead we assume that ￿ is normally distributed with mean y and precision ￿,and that each agent i observes a private signal xi = ￿ +"i, where the noise terms
"i are distributed normally in the population with mean 0 and precision ￿. If and
only if
￿
2 ￿ 2￿￿, (1.1)
there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium has a threshold ￿
￿ such that above
￿
￿, the payo⁄ to investing is 1 and below ￿
￿, the payo⁄ to investing is 0.1
A number of commentators have questioned the relevance of the uniqueness
results, since in many economic environments where coordination is important,
interactions endogenously generate public information that might lead the unique-
ness condition to fail.2 An especially important source of endogenous public infor-
mation is prices, and papers by Tarashev (2003), Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvin-
ski (2005) and Angeletos and Werning (2005) have pursued various methods of
combining endogenous public information with the type of coordination game de-
scribed in the previous paragraph.3 In particular, Angeletos and Werning (2005)
consider a two period model where, in the ￿rst period, agents with private infor-
mation about ￿ engage in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium of a CARA
normal model of the economy of the type pioneered by Grossman (1976); the
private information is transformed into public information about ￿ embodied in
the price; in the second period, they engage in a coordination game of the type
described in the previous paragraph, depending on the parameter ￿. More private
information entering the ￿rst period leads to more public revelation and thus more
public information entering the second period. The net result is that increased
private information entering the ￿rst period makes uniqueness less not more likely
in the second period game. Thus there is a sense in which the comparative statics
from the static global game analysis is reversed.4
1This model and result ￿rst appeared in our 1999 working paper on "Coordination Risk and
The Price of Debt," eventually published as Morris and Shin (2004). A similar condition on
precisions is necessary and su¢ cient for uniqueness in global games where payo⁄s are linear in the
unknown parameter ￿, the class of global games used in our expository pieces, Morris and Shin
(1999, 2000, 2003). Related conditions can be derived for more general global games, although
in this case there is some gap between the known necessary and su¢ cient conditions, see Morris
and Shin (2004, 2005). Appendix B of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) already worked out
explicit uniqueness conditions for a normal signal "private value global game," where private
shocks represent idiosyncratic payo⁄s. Morris and Shin (2005) analyze the di⁄erences between
the uniqueness conditions for common value and private value global games.
2E.g., Atkeson (2000) and Hellwig (2002).
3Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2003, 2004) note (inter alia) how other sources of endogenous
public information may lead to multiplicity in such coordination games.
4The logic of this reversal is the same as that in Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2005),
2Prices may be essentially public in ￿nancial markets.5 But prices do not (as an
empirical matter) seem to fully reveal relevant information in ￿nancial markets.
Why do prices reveal so much information in the work described above? One
reason is that it is assumed that learning the average of private beliefs about ￿
automatically generates common knowledge. This counterfactual assumption is a
consequence of the simple model of private and public information employed in
Morris and Shin (2004) and later works using that model of coordination. This
model may be rich enough to allow higher order beliefs to play an interesting
role in static coordination games, but not rich enough to capture the role of
endogenous public information. Based on this intuition, we examine a richer
model of higher order beliefs that remains tractable but allows us to explore the
role of endogenous public information when common knowledge of average beliefs
does not automatically imply common knowledge of everything.
Our initial results are mixed. We show that if the agents￿average belief about ￿
is publicly announced, common knowledge about ￿ is not generated. This remains
true even as agents￿signals about ￿ become arbitrarily accurate. The intuition
here is that if there are at least two dimensions of aggregate uncertainty about ￿ in
the population, then a one dimensional price will not reveal the relevant aggregate
uncertainty and thus create common knowledge.
However, we also show that in noisy rational expectations equilibrium, prices
do generate common knowledge if the noise goes to zero (or the precision of pri-
vate signals becomes large). Thus the result in Angeletos and Werning (2005) is
surprisingly robust to the information structure. However, we argue later that
this ￿nding relies on rather special features of the CARA normal environment, in
particular, the common knowledge of no gains from trade that holds in either of
the limits mentioned. We discuss the relation of this result to the literatures on
the existence of fully revealing rational expectations equilibria and on informa-
tion aggregation in strategic common value trading mechanisms in the concluding
section 4. In section 2, we review the role of endogenous public signals in the
one dimensional signal model. The model with two dimensional private signals is
introduced and analyzed in section 3.
who examine the impact of endogenous public information in a model of currency crises that
combines a coordination game and noisy price revelation. We focus on the more stylised model
of Angeletos and Werning (2005) in our presentation, as it ￿ts better with our methodological
point.
5But market participants observe prices at di⁄erent times and cannot in fact simultaneously
execute unlimited trades at the quoted price even they did observe prices at the same time, so
there may be limits even on this claim.
32. One dimensional private signals
Let ￿ be normally distributed with mean y and precision ￿. Suppose that a
continuum of agents observe private signals: agent i observes xi = ￿ + "i, where
the "i are normally distributed with mean 0 and precision ￿ in the population.
2.1. Higher Order Beliefs and Exogenous Public Signals




































































An important point to notice is that all higher order expectations are pinned down
by ￿ and E (￿). That is,
E
k










E (￿) ￿ ￿
￿
.
2.2. Endogenous Public Signals: Observing Opinion Polls
Now suppose that there is no exogenous public signal, but that the average opinion
E (￿) is observed with noise. Thus everyone observes a second noisy signal p =
4E (￿)+￿, where ￿ is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision ￿. Note that
Ei (￿) = xi and thus E (￿) = ￿. Thus each agent observes
p = ￿ + ￿














Notice that if the public opinion poll consisted of sampling n individuals, we would
have ￿ = n￿. In the limit as n ! 1 or ￿ ! 1, y and E (￿) are both publicly
observed, it now becomes common knowledge that the true value of ￿ is
E (￿).
2.3. Endogenous Public Signals: Observing Prices
Endogenous learning about agents￿beliefs may occur through prices rather than
opinion polls. So consider a noisy CARA normal rational expectations equilib-
rium of the type developed by Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). Thus assume the contin-
uum of agents have the information structure described above and each agent has




Also assume that there is a noisy supply of an asset s with mean 0 and precision
￿.
We solve for the noisy rational expectations equilibrium. Suppose that in
equilibrium the price is normally distributed with mean ￿ and precision ￿. Then
agent i￿ s demand for the asset is






= ￿￿ (xi ￿ p)
5Total demand is then ￿￿ (￿ ￿ p) + s. Thus




and p is normally distributed with mean and precision ￿2￿
2￿. Thus we obtain an




This is the key expression in Angeletos and Werning (2005). Note that if either
￿ ! 1 or ￿ ! 1, then the endogenous ￿ will also tend to in￿nite, and the
uniqueness condition (1.1) will be violated.
3. Two dimensional private signals
Let ￿ be normally distributed with mean y and precision ￿. Suppose that a
continuum of agents observe two private signals each: agent i observes xik =
￿+￿k+"ik, for k = 1;2; each ￿k is independently normally distributed with mean
0 and precision ￿k. The idiosyncratic noise terms "ik are each independently
normally distributed in the population with mean 0 and precision ￿k. Thus each
agent has one public signal (y) and two private signals (xi1 and xi2) about ￿.
3.1. Higher Order Beliefs with Exogenous Public Signals
Observe that each xik is thus normally distributed with mean ￿ and precision
￿k+￿k


























Higher order average expectations E
k
(￿) will then di⁄er from E (￿) and will con-
verge to y as k ! 1.
63.2. Observing Opinion Polls
Now suppose that a public opinion poll is announced, and p = E (￿) becomes
common knowledge (for simplicity, we will abstract from noise in the public opin-
ion poll). Now the agents will have observed two public signals (y and p) and two
private signals (xi1 and xi2) concerning ￿. But despite the new information, their
views do not become common knowledge.6
But also observe that an individual who observed all the agents￿private infor-
mation could aggregate it into
E
￿ (￿) =
￿y + ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2
￿ + ￿1 + ￿2
.
Although this is a one dimensional variable, it is a su¢ cient statistic for (￿1;￿2),
and a public announcement of this single statistic would create common knowledge
beliefs about ￿. However, it seems non-generic that the public signal would re￿ ect
aggregate noise in exactly the right proportion.
3.3. Observing Prices
We now examine what information is revealed by prices in the noisy rational
expectations equilibrium. We assume the exogenous noisy supply of the asset,
normally distributed with mean 0 and precision ￿.
We adopt the usual trick of solving a noisy rational expectations equilibrium
by assuming a linear price function and then solving for parameters that make this
linear function an equilibrium price function. We assume that prices are equal to
p = a + (c1 + c2)￿ + c1￿1 + c2￿2 ￿ ds.
We will show that as ￿ ! 1, there is an equilibrium of this form with c1=c2 =
￿1=￿2. This exactly the condition required for prices to generate common knowl-
edge of beliefs about ￿.
Consider an agent who observes public signals y and p and private signals xi1
and xi2. We show in the appendix that his expected value of ￿ conditional on xi1,
xi2;y and p is
Ei (￿) = y + ￿1 (xi1 ￿ y) + ￿2 (xi2 ￿ y) + ￿p (p ￿ y)
6It would be interesting to check if there was uniqueness in the original coordination game
both before and after the announcement of the opinion. Unfortunately, we do not know how
to solve these models analytically.
7where
￿1 =

















￿￿1￿2 + ￿￿1￿2 + ￿￿2￿1 + ￿￿1￿2 + ￿1￿2￿1




1￿ (￿￿2 + ￿￿2 + ￿1￿2 + ￿1￿2 + ￿2￿2)
+c2
2￿ (￿￿1 + ￿￿1 + ￿1￿2 + ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿1)
1
C C C C
A
.
His variance of ￿ conditional on xi1, xi2 and p is
V =
d2 (￿1￿2 + ￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1 + ￿1￿2) + c2
1￿ (￿2 + ￿2) + c2
2￿ (￿1 + ￿1)
￿
Now by the standard CARA formula, agent i￿ s demand for the asset is
￿
V













([y + (￿1 + ￿2)￿ + ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2 + ￿p (p ￿ y)] ￿ p)
So













8Recall that we assumed
p = y + (c1 + c2)￿ + c1￿1 + c2￿2 ￿ ds
























c1 = ￿￿d and c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿d.





￿1￿2￿1 + ￿1￿1￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿2￿￿1￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2￿￿2￿1
￿1￿2￿2 + ￿2￿1￿2 + ￿2￿2￿￿2￿2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2￿￿1￿2
=
￿1￿1 (￿2 + ￿2) + ￿2￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ￿ ￿￿2)














2 ￿1￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2￿1 + ￿2￿2￿2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿2
￿
￿
￿1￿2 + ￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1 + ￿1￿2 + ￿2￿
￿
￿2 (￿2 + ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿1 + ￿1)
￿ (3.2)
=
￿ (￿1￿2 (￿1 + ￿2) + (￿1 + ￿2)￿1￿2 + ￿2￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ￿ ￿￿2)((1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ￿ ￿￿2))
(￿1 + ￿1)(￿2 + ￿2) + ￿2￿
￿
￿2 (￿2 + ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿1 + ￿1)
￿ ;









(￿1 + ￿1)(￿2 + ￿2) + ￿2￿
￿
￿2 (￿2 + ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿1 + ￿1)
￿




￿(￿1 + ￿1)(￿2 + ￿2) + ￿1￿2 (￿1 + ￿2) + (￿1 + ￿2)￿1￿2
+￿2￿
￿
￿1￿2 + ￿2 (￿￿2 + ￿￿2 + ￿1￿2 + ￿2￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿)




9We are interested in solutions of this system of equations (3.1), (3.2) and
(3.3) as ￿ ! 1. To explore this, consider one more change of variables, letting




￿1￿1 (￿2 + ￿2) +  ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)z
￿2￿2 (￿1 + ￿1) ￿  ￿2￿z
=
￿1￿1 (￿2 + ￿2)(￿1 + ￿2) +  ￿1 (￿2 + z)z
￿2￿2 (￿1 + ￿1)(￿1 + ￿2) ￿  ￿2 (￿1 ￿ z)z
This gives the following cubic equation in z:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
  (￿1 + ￿2)z3






+(￿1￿1 (￿2 + ￿2) + ￿2￿2 (￿1 + ￿1))
￿
z
+(￿1 + ￿2)￿1￿2 (￿1￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
= 0
As   ! 1, this equation has a root with
z ￿
(￿1 + ￿2)￿1￿2 (￿2￿1 ￿ ￿1￿2)
  (￿1￿2
2 + ￿2￿2
1) + (￿1￿1 (￿2 + ￿2) + ￿2￿2 (￿1 + ￿1))













































































































(￿￿1 + ￿￿1 + ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿1)
￿.
(3.4)
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Here is one explanation of the limit common knowledge of the previous section.
As ￿ ! 1, there is common knowledge that there are no gains from trade. In
this simple environment, every agent would trade on any private information not
revealed by prices. But by the limit no trade theorem, no agent trades. So all
private information must be revealed.
Another way of understanding the result is by return to the common knowledge
of aggregate statistics literature. Aumann (1976) showed that (under the common
prior assumption) common knowledge of the probabilities agents attached to an
event implied that those probabilities must be equal. McKelvey and Page (1986)
observed that common knowledge of an aggregate statistic of agents￿posteriors
was su¢ cient to ensure that agents￿posteriors were as if all private information
were revealed. Nielsen, Brandenburger, Geanakoplos, McKelvey and Page (1990)
showed the most general version of such a result. Part of the motivation of these
results was the idea that the aggregate statistic might be a market price, although
the exact conditions under which the results could be applied to market settings
do not seem to have been nailed down. The CARA normal environment in this
paper is one where the (endogenous) market price ends up being a well behaved
aggregate statistic of agents￿private beliefs and these arguments apply. The limit
no trade property is key to being able to employ this logic.
In an environment without this limit no trade property, we expect that the
limit common knowledge result will not survive. This is consistent with the foun-
dational literature on rational expectations equilibria: fully revealing equilibria
exist if the dimension of prices exceeds the dimension of uncertainty, but not
otherwise (e.g., Allen (1981)).
The solution concept of rational expectations equilibrium has the well-known
￿ aw that agents are expected to simultaneously learn from prices and treat them
11parametrically in their trading decisions (see, e.g., Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shu-
bik (1987)). The information aggregation literature has examined to what extent
explicit well-de￿ned trading mechanisms generate the information aggregation of
fully revealing rational expectations equilibria (key early contributions are Wil-
son (1977) and Milgrom (1979, 1981)). This literature is not close to addressing
the problem of multi-dimensional types (see Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) for
one attempt). In any case, there is a non-existence problem for rational expecta-
tions equilibria when the dimension of uncertainty exceeds the dimension of prices
(Allen (1982) and Anderson and Sonnenschein (1982)), so a complete analysis of
what will be revealed when agents with rich (multidimensional) higher order be-
liefs seems a long way o⁄.
The fact that prices may themselves play the role of public signals is an eco-
nomically important phenomenon that deserves the attention that it has received.
On the uniqueness question, it is hard to relate the abstract uniqueness conditions
of the static theory to real world applications. The formal, a priori, arguments
of Angeletos and Werning (2005) and Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2005)
that we should expect the uniqueness conditions to fail because of endogenous
information revelation may not be robust to richer higher order beliefs: it is quite
possible to observe public signals of average beliefs and have signals become arbi-
trarily accurate without generating common knowledge. The particular model of
Angeletos and Werning (2005) does turn out to be robust to richer higher order
beliefs, but it is not clear how robust this robustness is to other special features
of the CARA normal model. A general theory of what prices reveal when agents
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one can show that
￿1 =








￿ (c1￿1 (￿2 + ￿2) + ￿2c2 (￿1 + ￿1))
￿





















￿ (c1 + c2)
1
A
One can show that this expression equals
d2 (￿1￿2 + ￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1 + ￿1￿2) + c2
1￿ (￿2 + ￿2) + c2
2￿ (￿1 + ￿1)
￿
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